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Abstract. Philosophers of language distinguish among the lexical or linguistic
meaning of the sentence uttered, what is said by an utterance of the sentence,
and speaker's meaning, or what is conveyed by the speaker to her audience. In
most views,  what is said  is the  semantic or  truth-conditional  content  of the
utterance, and is irreducible either to the linguistic meaning or to the speaker's
meaning. I will show that those views account badly for people's intuitions on
what is said.  I will  also show that no distinguished level of what is  said is
required, and that the notion of linguistic meaning is the best placed to play the
role of what is said. This relies on two points. First, our intuitions on what is
said cannot be detached from the ways in which we talk about what is said, and
from the semantics of speech reports and indirect discourse in general. Second,
beside what is said, there is an equally important notion of what what-is-said is
said about, or that about which the speaker is talking. Here are, then, the three
ingredients needed for the theory of what is said: linguistic meaning, what is
talked about, and the semantics of reported speech.
1 The Received Wisdom about What Is Said, What Is Conveyed,
and Linguistic Meaning
In everyday life, we say things, and the things we say may change our lives, affect our
relationships and careers, and one may even go to jail because of what one has said.
There  is no doubt that people have a certain intuitive notion of  what is said, and
attempts have been made to account for it. In philosophy of language, what is said
(by someone who utters a meaningful string of sounds) is normally identified with the
truth-conditional content of the utterance, that is, some set of conditions such that the
utterance is true if and only if those conditions obtain. Such truth conditions are most
often seen as conditions on what the world must be like for the utterance to be true.
Suppose that on 15 July 2005 at noon I am in Prof. Jones' office, and I say:
(1) It's cold in here.
To determine the truth value of my utterance, one needs to determine whether it was
cold in Jones' office at noon on 15 July 2005: if it was, then (1) is true, and if it was
not, then (1) is false. This is why most views take the truth-conditional content of (1)
to correspond to the set of all those worlds in which at 12 pm, 15/07/05, it is cold in
Jones' office.   
We know from the speech-act theory that making utterances is a way of  doing
things. Consider (1) again. My interlocutor may reason that if I told her (1), that was
not to inform her that it was cold in her office, which she already knew. Hence I must
have intended to inform her of something else, like the following:
(2) I want you to close the windows.
My utterance of (1) clearly does not say the same thing as (2) (if I were to utter it),
but in the context at stake, (1) conveys what (2) says. The distinction between what is
said and what is conveyed, or  conversational implicature, has been discussed a lot
since Grice, and I will have little to say about it here (cf. Grice (89), Levinson (00),
Carston (02)). 
Our lexical knowledge of what the words uttered mean need not always determine
what is said by the utterance. But the move from lexical meaning to what is said is
supposed to be fairly direct, requiring only knowledge of some basic parameters of
the context of utterance: who is speaking, to whom, where and when, and to what
they are referring. Thus in (1), the linguistic meaning of the words uttered tells you
that (1) is true if it is cold in there, that is, where the utterance is made. To determine
the truth value of (1), one needs to determine first where the utterance is made, and
once this is seen to be Jones' office, we get that (1) is true if and only if it is cold in
Jones' office. 
What is said is thus normally seen as something that can be obtained in a more or
less straightforward way from the linguistic meaning of the words uttered, the syntax
of the sentence, and the basic contextual parameters. By contrast,  what is conveyed
heavily depends on the  context  and  requires  you to  reason about  the beliefs  and
intentions of your interlocutors, considerable general knowledge, and inference to the
best explanation. For instance, my utterance of (1) may also convey the opposite of
what it conveyed in our previous scenario. Suppose that 15 July is a very warm day,
but Jones' office is so air-conditioned that it is freezing in there. Then by uttering (1) I
could convey the following:
(3) I want you to open the windows.
The ways in which what is said and what is conveyed depend on the context has
led some some philosophers, such as Kent Bach, to distinguish between narrow and
broad context. Caricaturing somewhat, the standard view may thus be captured with
these two equations:1 
1 The schema is compatible with two views on the role of syntax in the determination of what
is said. One view holds that it is possible to assign a linguistic meaning to the entire (non-
ambiguous)  sentence,  so that  the  only parameters  of  the  narrow context  are,  roughly,  the
speaker and the spatio-temporal location of the utterance. The other view holds that linguistic
meanings can only be assigned to words, but not to larger syntactic compounds. In that case,
syntactic structure may be seen as provided by the narrow context (see King and Stanley (02)
for discussion).   
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linguistic meaning + narrow context = what is said
what is said + broad context = what is conveyed
In what follows, I will try to show that the notion of what is said supposed to fit
the two equations is at best a theoretical artifact, with two major shortcomings: it fails
to account for a large portion of our intuitions on what is said, and it does not extend
into a fine semantic account of reported speech and locutions such as 'what he/she
said'. Furthermore, the cases that I will appeal to actually appear to support this much
simpler view: 
linguistic meaning = what is said
linguistic meaning + context = what is conveyed
Clearly, if such a theory can be worked out, it will be preferable on the grounds of
parsimony and elegance, given that it does not require any distinguished level of what
is said. 
2 Linguistic Meaning vs. What Is Said
At a first glance, one might plausibly suppose that the linguistic meaning associated
with a sentence is the most obvious candidate to play the role of what is said by an
utterance of that sentence. I want to argue that this is indeed a very plausible view.
However, as already noted, this view is widely rejected nowadays. It will help, then,
to start with those cases that have motivated its rejection. For simplicity, in this paper
I will only consider a small fragment of English, including pronouns, ordinary proper
names, some spatio-temporal adverbs, and definite descriptions, without considering
the problems raised specifically by these. 
2.1 Different Meanings, Same Things Said
The first motivation for a distinguished level of what is said comes from utterances
whose speakers intuitively say the same thing, even though the sentences that they use
do not have the same linguistic meaning. Suppose that I say:
(4) I have been injured.
By uttering (4), I may inform you that I have been injured. Now, suppose that you
want to inform someone else, say Sonia, of this. You cannot use the same sentence
that I used, because then you would inform her that you, not I, have been injured. I
can refer to myself using the first person pronoun, but you need to find another way
of referring to me. For instance, you might say:
(5) Isidora has been injured.
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Or, if your conversation with Sonia already happens to be about me, you might just
say:
(6) She has been injured.
It is widely agreed that the sentences in (4),  (5) and (6) have different meanings,
because different linguistic conventions are associated with pronouns 'I' and 'she' and
proper names. The 1st person pronoun is used for the speaker, the 3rd person pronoun,
for some salient female, and the name, for a bearer of that name. Still, it is almost as
widely held that what you say in (5) or (6) and what I say in (4) is one and the same
thing – something like the proposition true in those and only those worlds in which I,
Isidora, have been injured before the time of my utterance. This intuition goes back at
least to Frege, who wrote: “It is not necessary that the person who feels cold should
himself give utterance to the thought that he feels cold. Another person can do this by
using a name to designate the one who feels cold” (1897, p. 236).2
2.2 Same Meanings, Different Things Said
The second motivation for the standard view is the idea that you can use one and the
same non-ambiguous sentence to express different things, provided that you use it in
different contexts. This insight, too, goes back to Frege: “The sentence ‘I am cold’
expresses a different thought in the mouth of one person from what it expresses in the
mouth of another” (ibid). Frege's insight has been taken up by David Kaplan: “What
is said in using a given indexical in different contexts may be different. Thus if I say,
today, “I was insulted yesterday,” and you utter the same words tomorrow, what is
said is different […] There are possible circumstances in which what I said would be
true but what you said would be false. Thus we say different things” (77, p. 500). 
Kaplan argued that there are two levels of meaning. Suppose that David Kaplan
says  “I was insulted yesterday”  on 15 July 2005.  Then there is a level of meaning
independent of the context of his utterance; that is, a level of meaning that captures
speakers' lexical knowledge and that tells you that this sentence may be used to say of
the speaker and the day before the utterance that he or she was insulted then. Such
descriptive, lexically encoded conditions that help you determine the reference, such
as being the speaker for the indexical 'I', or a salient female for the pronoun 'she', or
being called 'David' for the name 'David', correspond to what Kaplan calls character.3
2 A  thought in Frege’s terminology can, here at least, be thought of as  what is said, as the
phrase is used in the more recent literature. To be sure, there is controversy as to what was
Frege’s theory of indexicals (assuming that he had any), but this is irrelevant to the present
discussion.     
3 For proper names, there is considerably less agreement that they have any kind of linguistic
meaning. Kaplan himself, for instance, holds that proper names don't have characters in any
non-trivial sense. (In his formal system, the character of a proper name is a constant function
from contexts to individuals, whose value varies neither with the context nor with the world of
evaluation.) Here, however, I will be assuming the so-called metalinguistic view, which takes
the linguistic meaning of a name to be the condition of being called by or being a bearer of
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Then, there is a level of meaning that a sentence has only relative to some context of
utterance,  and  that  we  obtain  by  factoring  contextual  information  into  linguistic
meaning. This second level of meaning, which Kaplan calls 'content', would, in the
previous example,  be the proposition that  David Kaplan was insulted  on 14 July
2005. The interaction between the two levels, and between them and the level of truth
and reference, may be thought of as follows. The  character  of an expression, given
some context of utterance, gives you the expression's content; and the content, given
some circumstance of evaluation, gives you the expression's reference. In the case of
a sentence,  its  character,  given a context,  gives you a proposition,  and the latter,
given a world of evaluation, gives you a truth value. 
Since Kaplan, most philosophers virtually take it for granted that once you have
directly referential expressions in the language, such as demonstratives,  indexicals
and names, linguistic meaning differs from what is said in two respects: [1] there is
something in what is said that is not in the linguistic meaning, namely, the reference
of the directly referential expression; [2] there is something in the linguistic meaning
that is not in what is said, namely, the descriptive conditions lexically recorded in the
character. As François Recanati puts it, “the property of being the addressee is not a
constituent of the proposition expressed [by utterances containing ‘you’]: it is used
only to help the hearer identify the reference, which is a constituent of the proposition
expressed.” (93, p. 39)
3 The Landscape Today
It is interesting that almost everyone today accepts this twofold difference between
linguistic meaning and what is said. Almost everyone holds that  the referent of any
directly referential expression is a constituent of what is said without being part of the
linguistic meaning, while the descriptions associated the  expression are part of the
linguistic meaning without reaching into what is said. This view of directly referential
expressions, their linguistic meaning and their contribution to what is said appears to
be so entrenched in the contemporary philosophy of language that it is sometimes the
only thing agreed upon by authors whose views are otherwise radically different. It is
beyond the  scope  of  this  paper  to  try  to  depict  the  theoretical  landscape  in  any
thorough or systematic way. Let us simply take a few glances at this landscape, so as
to be aware of the variety of approaches to what is said defended today. 
3.1. The Main Camp (Literalism)
The view that  has emerged from Saul Kripke's  Naming and Necessity and David
Kaplan's  Demonstratives  is  the most widely adopted view, whose adherents include
people like Marga Reimer, Nathan Salmon, Scott Soames, Robert Stalnaker, Jason
that name. For argument and discussion, see Recanati (93); for a defense of the metalinguistic
view from the standpoint of semantics, see Geurts (97). 
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Stanley, Ken Taylor, and many others. Although there are many subtle differences
and points of disagreement among these authors, all of them draw a sharp distinction
between linguistic meaning and what is said. Furthermore, they take what is said to be
propositions,  traditionally conceived; which is  to say,  eternal  propositions,  whose
truth values depend on what the world is like, but do not vary with other things, such
as times or places or individuals.4 
Literalists hold that in the case of "pure" indexicals, such as the 1st and the 2nd
person pronouns and adverbs 'here', 'now', 'today' and the like, the linguistic meaning
itself is determinate enough to fix the reference, and hence determine what is said by
the utterance. For example, the linguistic meaning of 'I' tells you that its referent is the
speaker, and since there is always a unique speaker in any given context, the move
from the linguistic meaning to what is said is pretty much automatic. But they also
accept that in certain cases, the linguistic meaning is too poor  to determine what is
said.  Demonstrative pronouns are the case at  point: the linguistic meaning of 'he',
which  amounts  to  something  like  'salient  male  individual',  only  constraints  the
referent of 'he', but in order to determine the actual referent, who will then go into
what is said, one must take into account certain pragmatic facts about the utterance,
such as which individual was jointly attended to by the speaker and her audience in
the context of utterance. But the appeal to pragmatics is triggered here by something
from the sentence itself, namely the 3rd person pronoun. The trademark of literalism is
precisely that all the pragmatics involved in the determination of what is said must be
constrained by semantics.
Most literalists acknowledge that there need not always be an overt, phonetically
articulated element in the sentence to trigger the pragmatic resolution of an element
that will go into what is said. Consider:  
(7) Every bottle is empty.
If Sonia utters (7) at a party, she likely means to be saying that every bottle at that
party  is empty. In most views, the intended domain of quantification is taken to be
part of what is said. For instance, what is said by (7) would be the proposition true in
those and only those worlds in which every bottle at the party is empty (at that world,
at the time of utterance). In the context described, we take (7) to be false if some
bottle at the party is not empty, but we do not take (7) to be false just because there is
some bottle somewhere in the world that is not empty. If people's intuitions on truth
values are to be taken seriously, as contemporary semantics does, and if what is said
is conceived of as being a proposition, which varies in truth value along the possible
world dimension, but not along other dimensions such as times, locations or domains
4 The main camp is divided between those who conceive of propositions as structured entities
and those who model propositions by sets of possible worlds. It should be noted, too, that in
his formal system, Kaplan models contents as functions that map pairs consisting of a possible
world and a time to truth values, which is to say that such contents can and normally do take
different truth values at different times. However the informal understanding of what is said
that has subsequently emerged from Kaplan's work remains tied to the traditional notion of
proposition, that is, something that, if true, is true once and for all, and if false, is similarly
false once and for all.
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of quantification, then it is easy to understand why the domain of quantification, or
other parameters that similarly affect the truth value, have been seen as elements of
what is said. 
Indexicalism, a special variant of literalism, holds that for any element that reaches
into what is said, there must be some element in the syntax of the sentence uttered
whose semantic interpretation will trigger a pragmatic process, such as those involved
in  interpreting  demonstratives,  that  will  help  determine  what  is  said.  As Stanley
writes: "All effects of extra-linguistic context are traceable to elements in the actual
syntactic  structure  of  the  sentence uttered"  (00,  p.  391).  Be that  as  it  may, what
literalists  insist  on  is  that  the  pragmatic  processes  that  bridge  the  gap  between
linguistic meaning and what is said should always be semantically driven.
3.2. Contextualism
It is on this very last point that contextualism departs from literalism.5 Contextualists
hold that the linguistic meaning, to the extent that the notion makes sense at all, only
loosely constrains what is said. Various pragmatic processes may affect what is said,
without being triggered by any syntactic or semantic property of any element in the
sentence uttered. Consider for example:  
(8) Jones took out her key and opened the door.
A contextualist wants to say that part of what is said in (8), in the situation imagined,
is that Jones took the key out of her purse and that she opened the door with that key.
But there does not seem to be any element in the sentence uttered that invites the
interpreter to identify Jones' purse as that out of which she took her key, and there is
nothing that stands for how she opened the door (viz. with the key). Rather, it is the
conversational context itself that makes it part of what is said in (8) that she took the
key out of her purse and used it to open the door.
It is worth noting that on the issue of what it is that directly referential expressions
such as names or pronouns contribute to what is said, contextualists are pretty much
in agreement with literalists in that they hold that it is the expression's referent, and
nothing but the referent, that reaches into what is said. 
5 A remark about the labels is in order. Some authors that I have included in the main camp are
already qualified, say, by Cappelen and Lepore (05), as moderate contextualists. Recanati (04)
proposes a somewhat different taxonomy. He reserves the label 'contextualism' for those views
that allow optional pragmatic processes, not triggered by anything in the sentence uttered, to
enter into the determination of what is said.  Recanati's further distinction between moderate
and  radical  contextualism turns  upon  the  question  of  whether  the  notion  of  the  minimal
proposition expressed, determined by the syntactic and semantic properties  of the sentence
uttered, makes any sense. (On Recanati's understanding of contextualism, the two views hold
that the minimal proposition, if there is such a thing, does not play a role in determining what
is said.) I adopt  Recanati's taxonomy, but I will  not bother to draw this further distinction
between moderate and radical contextualism.  
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It is sometimes believed that contextualism tries to get rid of linguistic meanings
all together. But without being clear on what we understand by linguistic meanings,
this claim is hard to evaluate. Contextualists certainly want to say that the sentence
itself  does  not  express  anything  merely  in  virtue  of  its  lexical  meaning;  that  is,
anything  that  can  be  evaluated  for  truth  or  falsity  relative  to  a  possible  world.6
However,  contextualists do not deny that words have meanings, albeit very flexible
and often underdeterminate, tied to the notion of speakers' lexical knowledge.  They
also talk of the semantic potential even of complex expressions, and what has been
understood here by the linguistic meaning of a sentence need not be anything more
specific or proposition-like than such semantic potentials. 
3.3. Variants and Alternatives
Certain accounts can hardly be assimilated to either camp. Let us briefly look at three
such: semantic minimalism, Perry's reflexive-referential theory, and Bach's theory of
implicitures. 
3.3. 1. Minimalism 
Semantic minimalism, a view defended, for instance, by E. Borg,  H.  Cappelen, E.
Lepore,  or  J.  Saul, is a variant of literalism that tries to minimize,  if not outright
abolish, the role of pragmatics in the determination of  semantic or truth-conditional
content and of what is said. For example, in cases such as (7), minimalists typically
deny that the domain of quantification relevant to the truth value of a given utterance
is determined by the context. They would say instead that (7) is true if and only if
every bottle is empty, so that some non-empty bottle somewhere in the world would
be enough to falsify (7), regardless of what the party situation is like. 
Strangely enough, though, when it comes to directly referential expressions, these
"minimalists" do hold that the semantic content is richer than the linguistic meaning,
given that it includes the contextually specified referents of such expressions, but not
their characters. On this score, there is very little divergence between contextualism
and minimalism, views believed to be radically opposed.7 
6 Of course, it we take the relevant parameters of evaluation to be contexts, or situations, rather
than possible worlds, then it is no longer clear that the contextualist would want to deny that
the sentence  qua  sentence expresses anything; only, that  thing is very different from what
people think are the things that get expressed, which is, propositions. It is something that gives
you a proposition and is susceptible of having a truth value only relative to some context of
utterance, as broad as you like. For a discussion of the contextualist challenge to traditional
semantics see, for instance, Predelli (05) and Predelli (forthcoming).
7 Cappelen and Lepore actually have a rather elaborate view on what is said. While they hold
that  the  semantic  content  associated  with  an utterance is  a  proposition  determined  by the
linguistic meaning of the sentence and only the most basic pragmatic factors, such as who is
speaking, where and when, they abstain from identifying semantic contents with what is said.
In their view, there are indefinitely many things "said" by any given utterance, because there
can be indefinitely many possible reports of what has been said. Cf. Cappelen & Lepore (97). 
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3.3. 2. Perry's Reflexive-Referential Theory 
John Perry has argued that it is misleading to talk of the proposition expressed by an
utterance or of the truth-conditional content. For, there is a wide array of propositions
that may be associated with any given utterance, all of which provide, in one way or
another, a necessary and sufficient condition for the utterance to be true. Suppose
again that on 15 July 2005, David Kaplan says "I was insulted yesterday." The truth-
conditional  content  that  the  traditional  view  associates  with  this  utterance  is  the
proposition that Kaplan was insulted on 14 July 2005, while in Perry's view, that is
simply one among the contents associated with the utterance. There is also what he
calls the reflexive content, which captures the truth conditions of the utterance known
by any competent speakers, regardless of their knowledge of the context of utterance.
Thus, in virtue of what the words uttered by Kaplan mean in English, we know that
his utterance is true if and only if the speaker of that utterance was insulted on the day
before  the  utterance.  Linguistic  meaning  is  thus  captured  in  terms  of  reflexive
content. What is novel in Perry's theory is that the move from reflexive content (or
linguistic meaning) to the truth conditions as traditionally thought of may consist in
several steps, each of which results in a content that specifies a certain truth condition
for the utterance.  For example,  if you start from the reflexive content of Kaplan's
utterance above, and you add the fact that it is David Kaplan who made it, you get
that the utterance is true if and only if  Kaplan  was insulted on the day before the
utterance. Similarly, if you start from the reflexive content and add the fact that the
utterance was made on 15 July 2005, you get that the utterance is true if and only if
the speaker, whoever he or she may be, was insulted on 14 July 2005. Finally, if you
increment the reflexive content with the two facts together, you get that the utterance
is true iff David Kaplan was insulted on 14 July 2005, which is the content that the
main camp view would associate with the utterance.
Having stressed that “the binary distinction (...) is too simple,” Perry writes: “an
utterance has as  wide a  variety of  contents as we may find useful  to  isolate,  for
particular purposes of description and explanation. We can say that in at least the vast
majority  of  cases,  the  common  sense  concept  of  “what  is  said”  corresponds  to
contentC [ie, the usual propositional content]. This is a good reason for an account of
content to recognize this concept, but not a good reason to expect it to be the only or
even the most theoretically fruitful kind of content” (97, p. 17) 
Thus even though  Perry's  view alines  with the  traditional  view insofar  as  the
notion of what is said goes, it is more flexible and better equipped to deal with certain
problematic cases.8  
3.3. 3. Bach's Theory of Implicitures 
Let us close this overview of the theoretical landscape with the notion of impliciture,
due to Kent Bach. The motivation for this notion is twofold. Suppose that Sonia says
"Olaf  is  ready."  What  is,  one  might  ask,  the  truth-conditional  content  of  Sonia's
8 In my (03), I show how Perry's theory can handle certain cases that Kaplan's theory cannot,
but I also show that Perry's account, as it stands, is too flexible, and needs to be amended in
order not to predict that two given utterances express the same content when, intuitively, they
do not. 
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utterance? It seems difficult to hold that her utterance is true if and only if Olaf is
ready,9 because it is not clear what the world should be like for Olaf to be ready
simpliciter. Rather, to be ready is to be ready for something, and that for which Olaf
is said to be ready is something that the hearer must figure out from the context of
utterance. Now, in Bach's view, what is said by Sonia is indeed nothing more than
that Olaf is ready, but he also points out that this is not a full-fledged proposition. It is
what Bach calls a propositional radical, which can be fleshed out into a proposition
by specifying that for which Olaf is said to be ready. For instance, what Sonia might
want to communicate is that Olaf is ready to leave home to go to work. This process
Bach calls  completion, and what you obtain is the proposition that Olaf is ready to
leave home to go to work, which is the impliciture associated with Sonia's utterance.
It is the impliciture that gets communicated,  even though what is  said is only the
propositional radical.
The other motivation for implicitures comes from those cases in which there is a
mismatch between what the speaker literally says and what it is reasonable to suppose
that she means to be saying or communicating. Reconsider (7), that is, "Every bottle
is empty," uttered by Sonia at a certain party. Here, what is said is fully propositional.
There are clear truth conditions for her utterance, namely, that it is true if and only if
every bottle (simpliciter) is empty. However, as noted above, it is more reasonable to
suppose that Sonia means to be saying only of the bottles at the party that they are
empty. This process Bach calls expansion, and it, too, gives rise to implicitures, such
as the proposition that every bottle at the party is empty: "impliciture can be a matter
of  either  filling in  or  fleshing out what is  said.  Completion  is  the  filling in  of  a
propositional radical, and expansion is the fleshing  out of the minimal proposition
expressible by an utterance" (94, p. 144).
 Finally, what distinguishes implicitures for the usual Gricean implicatures is that
the former are "closely related to what is said" (ibid., p. 126). Impliciture is what gets
communicated and is already implicit in what is said. Implicature, on the other hand,
is something that the hearer must infer, using general knowledge and inference to the
best explanation, from what the speaker said or communicated and from her saying or
communicating it. 
4 Problems
I will now go through a series of problems for the standard theories of what is said,
only some of which have been raised or discussed in the literature.10
9 Note, though, that this is precisely what minimalists are eager to maintain.
10 There is a well-known kind of problematic cases for the referential theories, the so-called
Hesperus/Phosphorus cases. As applied to the notion of what is said, the problem is roughly
this. Suppose that Olaf says "Hesperus is bright in the morning." Since Hesperus just turns out
to be Phosphorus, the proposition expressed by Olaf's utterance is the same as it would be if he
had said instead "Phosphorus is bright in the morning." However, it is unclear that intuitively
he would be saying the same thing, and more importantly, we can think of contexts in which
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4.1. Time-Neutral and Location-Neutral What Is Said 
It is widely held that in simple sentences, the present tense works like a referential
expression (cf.  Partee  (73)).  It picks out a specific time, normally the time of the
utterance, and brings it into the semantic content and thereby into what is said by the
utterance. The problem is that if what is said is thus tied to a specific time, there will
be many cases in which people have the intuition that the same thing has been said,
and will easily report what has been said as being the same, even though the contents
of the reported utterances do not coincide on the time picked out by the present tense.
To see the point, it is enough to reconsider one of our previous examples:
(9) She has been injured. (Sonia talking of Jones, on Monday)
(10) Jones has been injured. (Miles talking to Dorsky, on Tuesday).
(11) That's what Sonia said, too. (Dorsky's reply)
The report in (11) is intuitively true.11 We easily take Sonia and Miles to have said
the same thing, namely, that Jones has been injured, even though their utterances are
made at different times and therefore have different contents, namely, that Jones was
injured prior to t1, the time of Sonia's utterance, vs. that she was injured prior to t2, the
time of Miles' utterance. 
Note that not only the contents, but the linguistic meanings of the sentences uttered
are different, too. The meaning of the proper name tells you to pick out a bearer of
that name, while the 3rd person pronoun 'she' tells you to pick out a salient female.
The intuition that Jones and Miles say the same thing cannot, then, be explained by
their having uttered the same sentence, since they have not. 
 Some might think that the reason why we can so easily report Sonia and Miles as
having said the same thing is this. It is a fact that if some event e has happened prior
to time t1, and if t1 is before t2, then event e has happened prior to time t2. It follows
that the truth of Jones' utterance entails the truth of Miles' utterance. In section 4.3.,
we will see more cases that suggest that when the truth of u1 entails the truth of u2, we
tend to report what is said by u2 as having been already said by u1. 
However, there are many cases in which intuitively, we say the same thing, even
though the temporally specified contents of our utterances are neither the same, nor
does one entail the other. Consider Jones in London, on 15 July 2005, saying:
the truth value of reports of what Olaf has said are sensitive to the choice of the name that he
has used. This problem of substitution failures of co-referential names in opaque contexts has
given rise to a huge literature, which is why I abstain from tackling it here. See eg Salmon (86)
or Soames (02) for a defense of the referential treatment that explains away the intuitions on
what is said and on the truth value of speech/belief reports. See eg Crimmins and Perry (89) or
Recanati (03) for alternative referential accounts that respect the intuitions, while still treating
proper names as directly referential expressions.   
11 A note about the methodology adopted in this paper. The intuitions have been gathered from
three native English speakers, and three native French speakers for analogous cases in French.
Of course, we can only speculate that if tested more broadly and in a better controlled way, the
intuitive judgments of truth and falsity of these reports will still be the same. 
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(12) It is cold and windy.
Suppose now that three days later, Miles says in San Francisco:
(13) It is cold and windy.
There is clearly a sense in which Jones and Miles are saying the same thing. For,
they are both saying that it is cold and windy. While saying the same thing, namely,
that it is cold and windy, Jones is talking of London on the 15th of July, and Miles is
talking of San Francisco on the 18th of July, which is why their utterances need not
have the same truth value. Still, this difference in truth value does not mean that what
is said is different; or at least, there is no obvious reason why it should. Note, though,
that when we say the same thing in the sense in which (12) and (13) say the same
thing, but are also talking of the same thing, our utterances will have the same truth
value.
The standard theories assign different contents to (12) and (13). (12) is taken to
express the proposition that it is cold and windy in London on 15 July 2005, and (13),
the proposition that it is cold and windy in San Francisco on 20 July 2005. What
these theories need here are time-neutral and location-neutral contents, ie contents
that are functions not only of possible worlds, but also of  times  and  places.12 But
time-neutral contents have not always been welcomed (Evans (79)), so some might
try to avoid introducing them. To account for the intuition that Jones and Miles are
saying the same thing, namely that it is cold and windy, defenders of propositional
contents might point out that Jones and Miles are using the same sentence, albeit to
express different propositions. And perhaps we report what is said as being the same
simply because the sentences uttered are the same. 
Though this account might work fine for (12)-(13), it fails to generalize. Suppose
that on Wednesday 20 July, Jones, Miles and Dorsky are together in San Francisco,
and it is incredibly cold and windy. The next day in Stanford, Jones says to Miles:
(14) It is cold and windy, though less than yesterday in the city.13
Next, suppose that on Saturday, 23 July, in London, Dorsky says to Miles:
(15) It is cold and windy, though less than Wednesday in San Francisco.
Miles might then reply to Dorsky, based on the conversation that he had had with
Jones:
(16) Jones said that, too.
12 As previously noted,  Kaplan's formal system does employ contents  that are functions  of
times. However, the intuitive notion of what is said, for Kaplan as well as for his followers, is
time-specific. 
13 A remark on the geographical setting of the example: in Stanford, and generally in the Bay
Area, 'the city' is normally used to refer to San Francisco.   
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The intuitions here are that Miles' reply is just fine, he is not saying anything false.
There is certainly a sense in which Jones and Dorsky are saying the same thing, for
they are both saying that it is cold and windy, but less than in San Francisco on 20
July 2005. And this might account for the intuition that (16) is true, when properly
disambiguated.
Once we accept that there is a sense in which what is said by (14) is the same as
what is said by (15), and once we start looking for a semantics of speech reports on
which Miles' report in (16) comes out true (on one of its readings), we can no longer
stick with the traditional view. For, the propositions expressed by (14) and (15) are
different, the one being that Stanford on July 21 is less cold and windy than San
Francisco on July 20, the other being that London on July 23 is less cold and windy
than San Francisco on July 20. However, in contrast with the case of (12) and (13),
the sentences used by Jones and Dorsky have different linguistic meanings. In (14),
'yesterday in the city' bids you to look for a salient city and a day before the day of an
utterance of 'yesterday'. In (15), 'Wednesday in San Francisco' bids you to look for a
salient Wednesday and a place that bears the name 'San Francisco'. If, for instance,
Dorsky were to use the same sentence as Jones, her utterance would be true if on July
23, in London, it  was less cold and windy than on  July 22,  presumably again  in
London.
In sum, the standard account of what is said faces a challenge when presented with
utterances that do not concern the same spatio-temporal locations, nor are utterances
of the same sentence, and yet, people have no problem hearing them and reporting
them as saying the same thing. 
4.2. Same Meanings, Same Things Said
Let us go back to the 1st person pronoun 'I'. Suppose that Jones says:
(17) I have been injured.
Next, suppose that, possibly at a different time, Dorsky says:
(18) I have been injured.
Despite Frege's intuition that Jones and Dorsky will express different  thoughts, and
despite Kaplan's echoing claim that different people using the 1st person pronoun say
different things, people have equally strong intuitions that in some important sense,
what Jones says in (17) is the same as what Dorsky says in (18). They each say that
they have been injured.14 Similarly, consider Miles who, having heard Jones in (17),
now replies to Dorsky in (18):
14 As Richard  Feldman wrote:  "We can say that  what  I  assert  by uttering  'I  was insulted
yesterday' is something that can be true for, or relative to, one person at one time, while being
false relative to some other person at the same or some other time. So you and I assert the
same thing by uttering 'I was insulted yesterday' and this thing may be true for me when I
assert it and false for you when you assert it." (80, p. 79)
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(19) Jones said that, too.
To be sure, as it stands, (19) is ambiguous between Jones' having said that Dorsky
had been injured and Jones' having said that she herself had been injured. But if Jones
has never heard of Dorsky, and if this is common knowledge in the context of (19),
the report that  Jones said that,  too will be taken to mean that Jones said that she
herself had been injured; and, given (17), this report intuitively comes out true.
Here is some more evidence from speech reports that suggests that at least in some
sense, (17) and (18) say the same thing:
(20) Jones said that she had been injured, and so did Dorsky.
(21) Jones said that she had been injured, and Dorsky said it, too.
(20) is ambiguous between a "sloppy" and a "strict" reading, and so is (21).15 Either
Dorsky said that she herself had been injured, or she said that Jones had been injured.
But the mere availability of the sloppy reading is enough to pose a problem for the
standard theories. For, the propositional contents of (17) and (18) are different and
cannot play the role of what is said, if this is to be judged and reported as being the
same.
The standard response to this sort of cases has been to point out that the sentences
used by Jones and Dorsky are the same, and then suggest that when people use the
same sentence or utter the same words, it is usually fine to report them as having said
the same thing, even though, strictly speaking, they said different things, since they
expressed  different  propositions.  In  sections  4.4. and  4.5.,  I  will  show that  this
response is unsatisfactory, because it fails to generalize.
4.3. Same Implications, Same Things Said 
It is because of examples like these that some philosophers started to doubt that the
notion of what is said had any determinate and precise sense. Lewis wrote: “Unless
we give it some special technical meaning, the locution ‘what is said’ is very far from
univocal. It can mean the propositional content, in Stalnaker's sense (horizontal or
diagonal). It can mean the exact words. I suspect that it can mean almost anything in
between” (81, p. 97).16
Ziff (72) offers other examples that similarly show how versatile the notion of what
is said can be. Here is an example inspired by one of Ziff's. Suppose that Jones and
Dorsky went to a certain party, to which Miles could not go. Miles now wants to
know how the party went. He asks Jones, and she says:
15 The sloppy/strict distinction has been much discussed in the linguistic literature on ellipsis
and anaphora. See eg Lasnik (89), Lappin (97), Buring (03).
16 Stalnaker's horizontal  propositional  contents are the usual propositions expressed,  eg for
(17), that Jones has been injured prior to t, where t is the time of her utterance of (17), while
the diagonal contents correspond more or less to linguistic meanings.  
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(22) I should have stayed home and watched television.
Later, Miles asks Dorsky, who says:
(23) It was the lousiest party I've ever been to in my whole life.
Miles might well reply:
(24) Jones said that, too.
Or, talking yet to someone else who did not go to the party, Miles might report:
(25) You didn't miss much. Both Jones and Dorsky said that the party was boring.
Although the intuitions here are not very robust, it is still true that in everyday life,
we make reports of this sort. It is not unusual to report two people as having said the
same  thing  when  their  utterances  have  some  implication  in  common,  and  that
implication  is  relevant  in  the  context  of  the  report.  Thus,  while  Jones  does  not
literally say in (22) that the party was boring, what she does say, viz. that she should
have stayed at home and watched TV,  implies, given some contextual background,
that the party was boring. And similarly for (23).
 Here is another example in which the fact that one utterance entails another makes
it possible to report them as saying the same thing. Suppose that  Prof. Jones says to
her class:
(26) Everyone should go to Prof. Dorsky's lecture tomorrow night.
The next day, someone tells Sonia, one of Jones' students:
(27) You should go to the lecture tonight.
Sonia might reply:
(28) Yeah, Professor Jones said that, too.
Now, Jones in (26) did not say anything explicitly about Sonia. She said something
more general, namely, that everyone should go to the lecture. This entails that Sonia,
too, should go to the lecture, and this might be what makes us feel that what is said in
(27) has already been said in (26). Note, though, that if you exchange the sentences
uttered in (26) and (27), the report in (28) will no longer sound correct.
A variety of similar cases have been noted and discussed by Cappelen and Lepore
(97). In this paper, though, I do not want to press upon this kind of cases. I only want
to point out certain differences between utterances that we report as saying the same
thing because they have some implication in common and the other cases discussed in
this paper. In those other cases, there is normally no entailment or implication shared
by utterances reported as saying the same thing, such as (17) and (18). True enough,
it  follows as well from Jones'  having been injured as from Dorsky's having been
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injured that  someone  has been injured. But it is clearly not because of this that we
report (17) and (18) as saying the same thing. For, if I say "Jones has been injured"
and then you say "Dorsky has been injured," I certainly cannot correctly reply "That's
what I've just said." Now, it is also true that both the truth of (17) and the truth of
(18) pragmatically entail,  as some might say, that  some speaker has been injured.
Although this is indeed an implication shared by (17) and (18), we are going to see
that this sort of implication is probably not enough to explain why we can so easily
report what is said as being the same. 
Another difference is that in the cases considered in sections 2.1., 4.1., 4.2. and 4.4.,
not only is it fine to reply That's what so-and-so said, too, but it is generally just as
fine to say, That's exactly what so-and-so said, too. On the other hand, if we report
that  the same thing has been said  based on  some implication shared  by the  two
utterances, adding 'exactly' makes a huge difference, and what had been seen as a fine
report will no longer sound correct.
4.4. Different Meanings, Different Propositions, Same Things Said
Let us take stock. We have seen that when different people say "I have been injured,"
there is the intuition that, at least in a sense, they are saying the same thing, for each
is saying that he or she has been injured. The usual way of dealing with such cases is
to point  out  that  those people are all  using the same sentence,  which would then
ground the intuition that  they are saying the  same thing – for,  after  all,  they are
uttering the same words.
In this and in the next section, I want to show that this explanation is not quite
satisfactory. Although using the same sentence may partly account for the intuition
that the same thing has been said, that cannot be the end of the story. Even when the
propositions expressed by the two utterances are different, it is neither necessary nor
sufficient to use the same sentence in order to be saying the same thing, or for the
report that the same thing has been said to come out intuitively true. 
Suppose that Wednesday evening, after Dorsky's lecture on contextualism, Jones
tells Miles:
(29) I enjoyed this lecture very much. 
Next week, Miles sees Sonia, who was also at Dorsky's lecture. Sonia says:
(30) I very much enjoyed Prof. Dorsky's lecture last Wednesday.
Miles might correctly reply to Sonia:
(31) That's what Jones said, too.
The sentences used by Jones and Sonia are different, and their linguistic meanings are
different. Had Jones used the sentence that Sonia had used, she could not have been
referring to that same lecture, which was the same day as her utterance, and not the
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previous Wednesday. Still, there is an important sense in which Jones and Sonia are
saying the same thing, for each is saying that she enjoyed a certain lecture, Dorsky's
lecture on contextualism. However, the propositional contents that Kaplanian theories
assign to (29) and (30) are different, the first being that Jones enjoyed that lecture,
and the second, that Sonia enjoyed it, and there is no entailment from either content
to the other.
As another example, consider this dialogue between Jones and Miles:
(32) I am always in disagreement with the Chair of my department.
(33) That's what Dorsky said that, too.
Without further contextual cues, (33) is ambiguous. What is it that Dorsky said?
Suppose that Jones is in the Philosophy Department, whose Chair is Prof. Phillips,
while Dorsky is in the Linguistic Department, whose Chair is Prof. Lindberg. Then
Dorsky might have said any of the following:
(34) Jones is always in disagreement with the Chair of her department.
(35) Jones is always in disagreement with Phillips.
(36) I am always in disagreement with the Chair of the Philosophy Department.
(37) I am always in disagreement with Phillips.
(38) I am always in disagreement with the Chair of my department.
(39) I am always in disagreement with Lindberg.
What (32) has in common with (34) and (35) is the usual propositional content.
What (32) has in common with (36) and (37) is what we might call a speaker-neutral
content. Note, though, that part of the speaker-related information in (32) has been
resolved, so to speak. The person with whom the speaker is said to be always in
disagreement has been identified as Phillips, the Chair of the Philosophy Department.
The speaker-neutral content that allows Miles to report Dorsky as having said the
same thing as Jones is, then, being on very good terms with Phillips. 
Finally, what (32) has in common with (38) and (39) is yet another speaker-neutral
content: being always in disagreement with the chair of one's own department. To be
sure, (32) and (38) have something more in common: they are utterances of the same
sentence. That is perhaps why the report in (33) sounds much better when it reports
(38) rather than (39). 
At any rate, my main point here is that (36) and (37), in which Dorsky says that
she in always in disagreement with a certain person, to wit, Phillips, can be heard and
reported as saying the same thing as (32),  in which Jones says that  she herself is
always in disagreement with Phillips. However, neither are the propositional contents
of these utterances the same, nor are the sentences uttered the same or synonymous.
Our last example may also be used to show that not just "anything in between"
[propositional content and the words uttered] can play the role of what is said. For,
suppose that Dorsky says:
WHAT IS SAID, LINGUISTIC MEANING, AND DIRECTLY REFERENTIAL EXPRESSIONS 17 / 24
(40) Jones is always in disagreement with the Chair of my department.
There is no way of correctly reporting (40) as saying the same thing as (32). If Miles'
reply in (33) were based on Dorsky's utterance of (40), it would be considered false.
The interesting thing is that (40) and (36) or (37) are, so to speak, symmetrical with
respect to (32).  If you take the sentence uttered by Jones, viz.  I am on very good
terms with the Chair of my department, and resolve the definite description 'the Chair
of my department,' or just the possessive 'my department', you obtain the sentences
uttered in (37) and (36). Similarly, if you take Jones' sentence and resolve only the
indexical 'I', you obtain the sentence uttered in (40). However, (36) and (37), on the
one hand, and (40) on the other, behave very differently in qualifying as saying the
same thing as (32). 
4.5. Again, Same Meanings, Different Things Said 
Just as using the same sentence is not required for the same thing to be said, it is not
enough either. Consider the following (minimal) pair of situations:
(i) speaker-neutral what is said
(41) I am a fool. (Jones talking to Miles)
(42) I am a fool. (Olaf talking to Miles)
(43) That's what Jones said, too. (Miles' reply to Olaf)
(ii) addressee-neutral what is said
(44) You are a fool. (Jones talking to Sonia, overheard by Miles)
(45) You are a fool. (Miles talking to Olaf)
(46) *That's what Jones said, too. (again, Miles talking to Olaf)
There is a striking asymmetry between the 1st and the 2nd person pronoun in how they
behave in speech reports. Consider (43). As it stands, it is ambiguous between Jones'
saying that Olaf is a fool and her saying that she herself is a fool. If it is common
knowledge in the context of (43) that Jones has never heard of Olaf and has no idea
who he or she is, the dominant reading of (43) will be its sloppy reading, and (43)
will be true in virtue of Jones' having uttered (41). However, if we try the same sort
of sloppy report by simply replacing 'I' by 'you', no such report will be available. For,
people  have  the  strong  intuition that  (46)  is  not  ambiguous,  but  downright  false
(assuming that Jones never said that Olaf was a fool). 
The asymmetry between cases (i)  and (ii)  raises the following problem for the
standard theories. There, propositional contents play the role of what is said. But (41)
and (42) have different contents, and still, at least in a sense, they say the same thing,
and, properly disambiguated, the report in (43) is intuitively true. One might think
that this happens because the sentences uttered in (41) and (42) are the same. But
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take (44) and (45). There, too, the sentences uttered are the same, but we do not get a
sloppy reading for (46). That report is not ambiguous, but false. What this shows is
that something is missing in the account that the standard theories provide for case (i)
to begin with.
Note, however, that if the reporter explicitly mentions the person that the reportee
was talking to, then the use of the 2nd person pronoun will similarly give rise to the
strict/sloppy ambiguity in the report of what has been said. For, consider:
(47) That's what Jones said, too, to Sonia. (Miles talking to Olaf)
(48) That's what Jones told Sonia. 
The reports in (47) and (48) are ambiguous between Jones' telling Sonia that Olaf is a
fool  and her telling Sonia "You are a fool."  Again, if  it  is  part  of the contextual
background that Jones couldn't be talking of Olaf, then the sloppy reading prevails
and the reports come out true on the grounds of Jones' utterance of (44).17
The difference between the 1st person pronoun and 3rd person and demonstrative
pronouns is probably even more striking. Consider:
(i) pronoun-reference-neutral what is said
(49) She is a fool. (Jones, referring to Sonia)
(50) She is a fool. (Olaf, referring to Mrs. Li)
(51) *That's what Jones said, too. (Miles' reply to Olaf)
(ii) demonstrative-reference-neutral what is said
(52) These are healthy. (Jones, talking of carrots)
(53) These are healthy. (Alex, talking of caramel candies)
(54) *That's what Jones said, too. (Miles' reply to Alex)
Intuitively, neither (51) nor (54) are ambiguous. There is only one way to understand
these reports, which is that Jones said that Mrs. Li was a fool, and that she said that
caramel candies  were healthy. Now, if  uttering the same sentence is  supposed to
account for certain cases in which we can correctly report that the same thing has
been said, then why is it that in other cases, such as those involving demonstrative
pronouns, the prediction turns out to be wrong? Until it can provide an answer to this
question, the standard theory of what is said proves to be very limited.
As a final  remark,  we can have sloppy readings even with the 3rd person and
demonstrative  pronouns,  provided  that  what  the  reportee  was  talking  about  and
referring to is made explicit in the report:
17 In some exceptional cases, it is possible to get the strict/sloppy ambiguity with the 2nd person
pronoun even if the person talked to is not explicitly mentioned. Here is one. Miles says to his
wife: "You are the loveliest woman ever."  She replies: "That's what every husband says in the
early years of marriage." But it is likely that in cases such as this, we get the sloppy reading
precisely because the strict reading is pragmatically unavailable.
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(55) That's what Jones said, too, of Sonia. (Miles' reply to Olaf)
(56) That's what Jones said, too, for carrots. (Miles' reply to Alex)
But the fact remains that there is an interesting asymmetry between the 1st person and
the other pronouns, and any good theory of what is said should try to account for it.
5 Linguistic Meaning = What Is Said
Although most philosophers take the distinction between linguistic meaning and what
is said to be essential and well-delineated, the usefulness of this distinction has been
questioned in the past. We have already noted Lewis' skeptic attitude. In a somewhat
more positive vein, Feldman writes: "We can say that there is only one meaning – the
one  which  Kaplan  calls  'character'.  When  two  people  utter  the  same  indexical
sentence, they assert the character of that sentence. But that character may be true
relative to an index containing one person and false relative to an index containing
the other"  (80,  p.  81).18 To my knowledge, Feldman himself did  not develop this
proposal,  and  it  is  unclear  how he  would have  dealt with the  apparent  counter-
examples, such as the cases in which intuitively the same thing has been said, even
though different sentences have been uttered (sections 2.1, 4.1 and 4.4), or the cases in
which the same sentence has been uttered, yet the reports of the same thing having
been said come out intuitively false (section 4.5). What I would like to do in this final
section is suggest, albeit in very rough lines, how this sort of proposal can be made to
work regardless of those problems. 
5.1. What Is Said, What Is Talked About, and Reported Speech 
It will be helpful to begin by laying down the main tenets of our proposal :
a) what is said by a given utterance is nothing more or less than
the linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered;
b) the linguistic meaning (of a sentence) is something that can be
true with respect to some things while being false with respect
to some other things;
c) when we make an assertion, we do not merely assert what the
sentence uttered means in virtue of its linguistic meaning, but
we assert it of, or about, something;
d) the linguistic meaning of indexicals, proper names, and other
directly referential expressions is presuppositional. That is to
18 The notion of an index comes from the Index Theory, as in Lewis (72). An index consists of
a number of parameters, such as an agent, a time, a place; roughly, all the shiftable contextual
parameters relevant to interpreting a given utterance.
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say, the presupposition encoded in the meaning normally
scopes out of the negation or other operators, and it is
normally common knowledge among the speaker and her
audience which things satisfy which presuppositions;
e) when we report what is said by some utterance as being the
same (or different) as what is said by some other utterance,
we presuppose it known in the context of the report what the
reported utterances are respectively about.
Since it is meanings, not propositions, that are presupposed, and since meanings
are not true or false tout court,  but true or  false  of  things (times,  places,  objects,
situations), instead of asking whether a given presupposition is satisfied in a given
context, we must ask whether it is satisfied, in a given context, of a given thing. But
apart from this proviso, our proposal is neutral on the question of how to understand
or formally account for the notion of presupposition .19 
To get a better grip on it, it will help to see how this account works on a particular
example. Consider Sonia who, holding up a carrot in her hand, says to Alex:
(57) This is healthy.
Since the linguistic meaning of 'this', that is, the condition of being a salient, proximal
object, is lexically marked as a presupposition, the question of which objects happen
to satisfy this presupposition will supposedly be common knowledge in the context of
(57). And since the carrot that Sonia holds up in her hand most obviously meets this
condition, she will manage to say something about  it, viz. that it is healthy.20 Now,
the  linguistic  meaning of  the  whole sentence  is  something that  will  be  true  with
respect to some things at some times and false with respect to the same or different
things at the same or some other time. For example, it is true of the carrot that Sonia
is holding up in her hand and of the situation in which she is uttering (57), but it is
false of the same carrot  relative to the situation in which Sonia  utters (57) while
holding up a caramel candy in her hand (because the carrot is no longer salient, it is
no longer "a this"), and it is again false of the candy itself, because caramel candies
are not healthy (or so we assume).
The presuppositional behavior of indexicals and names accounts for the fact that
when we use a word like 'this', there is normally something that we want to talk about.
But it also accounts for the fact that when we report what someone else has said, we
cannot just use in our report the same sentence that this person has used. Consider the
following report, as uttered in a situation in which the most salient thing, attended to
by the speaker and the hearer together, is a certain caramel candy:
(58) Sonia said that this was healthy. 
19 For instance, most theories along the lines of Stalnaker's pioneering proposal (cf. Stalnaker
(73)) would work fine enough for d) and e). If we were to choose, we would opt for some
variant of the so-called binding theory of presupposition (cf. van der Sandt (92), Geurts (99)).
20 For a discussion of this "procedural" role of linguistic meaning in utterance interpretation,
and in particular in reference resolution, see my (05). 
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There is no way in which Sonia's utterance of (57) could make the report in (58)
come out true. The reason why this is so is that the presupposition carried by 'this'
cannot be "accommodated locally," to use the jargon. The description encoded in the
linguistic  meaning  of  the  demonstrative  in  (58)  will  scope  out  of  the  indirect
discourse operator 'said that', which means that it will be used to single out something
in the context of the report, rather than in the context in which the reported utterance
was made. That is why (59), but not (60), may serve as an approximative paraphrase
of (58):
(59) There is a salient, proximal object such that Sonia said that it was healthy. 
(60) *Sonia said that there was a salient, proximal object and that it was healthy.
Finally, let me try to make it  more clear what tenet e) amounts to. Reconsider
Sonia's utterance, made in reference to the carrot, followed by a reply from Alex: 
(61) This is healthy. 
(62) Jones said that, too. 
When Alex reports that Jones said what Sonia has just said, the issue of what it was
that Jones was talking about will be presupposed in the context of the report. Given
that Alex does not explicitly mention anything as being what Jones was talking about
when she said the same thing as Sonia, it will be understood that Jones was talking of
the same thing that Sonia is talking about, namely the carrot.21 This is why the report
will come out intuitively false when Alex makes it on the grounds of Jones' having
uttered the same sentence as Sonia did, while referring to something that was not a
carrot, say, to some candy. However, as it is known from the literature (Geurts (99)),
presuppositions can sometimes be anchored to an explicit element in the discourse.
That also happens in the case of reported speech, where the presupposition of what
the reported utterance was about may be bound to something explicitly mentioned, in
the same way in which anaphoric expressions get bound to elements in their discourse
environment:
(63) This is healthy. – Jones said that, too, of a candy. 
5.2.  Conclusion: an Agenda for the Future
I started this paper with a presentation of what we might call the received wisdom on
what is said, one of whose central tenets is the distinction between linguistic meaning
and what is said. We then saw two main types of cases that prima facie motivate this
distinction, the "different meanings, same thing said" cases and the "same meanings,
21 Obviously, Jones need not have been talking about the vary same carrot that Sonia has been
holding up in her hand. Jones might have pointed to a different carrot, or she could have said
"Carrots are healthy." Since the example involves some subtle issues about reference to kinds
and deferred reference, I will not press it any further.
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different things said" cases, as I called them. We also saw that even some radically
opposed views, like contextualism and minimalism, appear to agree on the question
of what it is that directly referential expressions such as proper names and personal
and demonstrative pronouns contribute to what is said. Then we moved to a series of
cases that square very badly with the distinction linguistic meaning vs. what is said.
In particular, we often get the intuition that the same thing has been said, even though
the reported utterances do not express the same (traditional) proposition, nor do the
sentences uttered have the same linguistic meaning. We have also seen cases in which
utterances of the same sentence are reported as saying the same thing, even though,
again, different propositions are expressed. However, such cases do not generalize
that easily, and we have noted interesting asymmetries among the ways in which 1st
person, 2nd person and other pronouns affect speech reports. In the end, we outlined,
in a very programmatic way, a positive account that takes what is said to be nothing
more or less than the linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered. The three elements
deployed in the construal of our account are linguistic meanings, what is talked about,
and the semantics of reported speech. Elaborating this account in due detail remains a
project for the future.  
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